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FOURTH AMENDMENT-TOTALITY OF
THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH
TO PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON
INFORMANT'S TIPS
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Aguilar v. Texas I and Spinelli v. United States,2 the Supreme Court
developed a two-pronged test to determine whether an informant's tip
contains sufficient probable cause3 to support the issuance of a warrant
under the fourth amendment. 4 The first prong of the test required the
police to inform a magistrate of the circumstances supporting the in-
formant's allegation of criminal activity. The second prong of the test
required the police to demonstrate that the informant was credible or
his information reliable.5 Last term, in Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme
Court abandoned the Agular-Spinelli test and adopted a totality of the
circumstances approach to determine whether an informant's tip estab-
lishes probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.6 Contrary to its
prior indication, the Court also refused to rule on the possibility of a
1 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
2 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
3 Probable cause exists "where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense had been or is
being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (bracketed material in original). The Supreme Court
has held that a determination of probable cause may be based on hearsay. Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960), overmdedon other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.
84 (1980).
4 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The fourth amendment warrant clause has been interpreted to re-
quire three things: that warrants be issued by neutral, disinterested judicial officers, that war-
rants be based on probable cause, and that warrants particularly describe the place and
person or things to be seized. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1974).
5 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
6 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
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good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.7
This Note examines the Gates decision and considers its impact on
the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment. This Note
concludes that, by replacing the Aguilar-Spineli standards with the total-
ity of the circumstances approach, the Court has failed to provide mag-
istrates and judges with practical guidelines for a determination of
probable cause. In addition, this Note suggests that the Court should
require that the corroboration of an informant's tip be of criminal, in-
stead of innocent, activity.
II. FACTS OF G.4TES
On May 3, 1978, the police in Bloomingdale, Illinois, received an
anonymous letter stating that Lance and Susan Gates were engaged in
selling drugs. The letter included the Gates' address in Bloomingdale
and said that on May 3, Susan Gates would drive their car to Florida
and, after a few days, Lance would fly down to Florida and drive the car
back with the trunk loaded with drugs. The letter also stated that the
Gates currently had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.8
Acting on the tip, Detective Mader of the Bloomingdale Police De-
partment determined the Gates' current address and learned that Lance
Gates had made a May fifth airplane reservation to West Palm Beach,
Florida. 9 An agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency monitored the
flight. Subsequently, federal agents in Florida reported that they had
observed Lance Gates arrive in West Palm Beach, take a taxi to a
nearby hotel, and go to a room registered to Susan Gates. The next
morning Lance Gates and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a car
bearing Illinois license plates issued to Lance Gates and drove north on
7 Id. at 2321.
8 Id. at 2325. The letter stated:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly make
their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his
wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with drugs, then
Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after she drops the car off in Florida.
May 3 she is driving down there again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to
drive it back. At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over
$100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their base-
ment.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire living on
pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are friends
with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house often.
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an interstate frequently used by travelers to Chicago.' 0
Mader presented a signed affidavit containing the foregoing facts
together with a copy of the anonymous letter to a judge of the Circuit
Court of DuPage County. Based thereon, the judge issued a search war-
rant for the Gates' house and automobile."
When the Gates returned home, the Bloomingdale police were
waiting. They searched the trunk of the Gates' car and found approxi-
mately 350 pounds of marijuana. A search of the Gates' home revealed
marijuana, weapons, and other contraband.' 2 The couple was indicted
for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver and with un-
lawful possession of a controlled substance. 13
The Illinois Circuit Court ordered that all the items discovered be
suppressed on the ground that the search violated the fourth amend-
ment because the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that the
Gates' automobile and house contained the discovered items.14 Both
the Illinois Appellate Court' 5 and the Illinois Supreme Court' 6 affirmed
the suppression of the evidence.
III. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
After receiving the briefs and hearing the oral arguments in Gates,
the Supreme Court requested the parties to submit additional briefs spe-
cifically addressing whether the exclusionary rule' 7 should permit a
good-faith exception for evidence obtained by police in a search and
seizure which they reasonably believed to be valid under the fourth
amendment.18 The Court, however, decided not to rule on the good-
10 Id. at 2325-2326.
11 Id. at 2326.
12 Id.
13 People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981), rev'd 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983).
'4 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
15 People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), aft'd, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423
N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
16 People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
17 In order to enforce the fourth amendment Warrant Clause, see supra note 4, the
Supreme Court has developed an exclusionary rule whereby evidence obtained in violation of
the Warrant Clause is inadmissible in court. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment.
18 The Court had asked the parties to address the following question:
Whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, MAp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. . . (1961); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383. . . (1914), should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not
to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and
seizure at issue was consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436, 436 (1982) (parallel citations omitted).
Justice White first suggested a good-faith exception in his dissent in Stone v. Powell:
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faith exception because the issue had not been presented to the Illinois
courts.19 The Court concluded that it could not rule on the validity of a
modification of the exclusionary rule in this case20 due to the potential
inadequacy of the record 2 ' and the possibility that the issue might have
been decided on an independent state ground.2 2 Thus, the Court left
the fate of the good-faith exception to be decided in another term.
23
IV. THE AGUILAR-SPINELLI TEST
The Supreme Court's decision in Gates abandoned the two-pronged
test that the Court had developed in Aguilar v. Texas 24 and Spineli v.
United States25 to determine whether an informant's tip established suffi-
cient probable cause for the issuance of a search or arrest warrant. In
Aguilar, the Court held that although an affidavit supporting a warrant
"[T]he [exclusionary] rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in
those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing law and having reasonable
grounds for this belief." 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
The theory behind the good-faith exception is that where officers honestly believe that
they are acting within the law, the exclusionary rule has no deterrent effect and serves only to
keep reliable, probative evidence from the jury. Id. at 540. Justice White reaffirmed his
adherence to the good-faith exception in his concurrence in Gates. 103 S. Ct. at 2341-47
(White, J., concurring). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has already adopted a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). For a thorough discussion of the
good-faith exception, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to The Excdusionav,
Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981).
19 103 S. Ct. at 2321. The Court relied on the "not pressed or passed upon" doctrine to
avoid deciding the good-faith issue. Under this doctrine, the Court will not consider any
claim that has not been presented to or decided by the highest court in the state where the
action is brought. Id. at 2321-22.
20 Id. at 2324-25. Justice White disagreed with the Court's refusal to decide whether the
exclusionary rule should be modified. Noting that the Gates' fourth amendment claim had
been raised at every level of the Illinois court system, he concluded that "the exclusionary rule
issue is but another argument pertaining to the Fourth Amendment question squarely
presented in the Illinois courts." Id. at 2337 (White, J., concurring). Thus, Justice White saw
no reason for the Court to avoid deciding the good-faith exception issue in Gates. Id. at 2340.
21 Id. at 2323. The Court noted that the record in the Gates case contained little informa-
tion regarding the subjective good faith of the officers who searched the Gates' house and
property. Such information would be crucial to the Court's determination of the validity of a
good-faith exception. Id.
22 Id. The Court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court had adopted its own exclusionary
rule and might have chosen not to adopt a good-faith exception even though the United
States Supreme Court had modified the federal rule.
23 The Court has granted certiorari to three cases involving the good-faith exception for
the coming term: United States v. Leon, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Colorado v. Quintero, 103
S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983). The Court has since
dismissed its grant of certiorari in Quintero because of the death of the respondent. 34 CRIM.
L. RPTR. at 4129.
24 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
25 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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may be based on hearsay information, the magistrate must be informed
of both the circumstances supporting the informant's allegations (the
basis-of-knowledge prong) and the circumstances demonstrating the in-
formant's credibility (the veracity prong) 26
The magistrate in Aguilar had issued a search warrant on the basis
of an affidavit which stated that police officers had "received reliable
information from a credible person" that the petitioner possessed
drugs.2 7 The Supreme Court noted that a magistrate cannot base a de-
termination of probable cause on conclusory statements or on an affi-
ant's belief alone,28 and found the affidavit defective because neither the
officers nor their informant had alleged in the affidavit that they had
personal knowledge of the information.2 9 Thus, the Court concluded
that the affidavit did not contain sufficient information to enable the
magistrate to independently judge the validity of the informant's con-
clusions and make a proper determination of probable cause.
30
In Spinelli, the Court expanded the Aguilar test to cover affidavits
which contained information partially corroborating an informant's
tip.3 1 The Court held that in evaluating such an affidavit, the magis-
trate must first measure the informant's report against the Aguilar stan-
dards to assess its probative value. If the tip is inadequate underAguilar,
the magistrate must examine the corroborating information to deter-
mine if probable cause exists.32 The corroborated tip, however, must be
as trustworthy as a tip that would pass the Aguilar test without corrobo-
26 378 U.S. at 114.
27 Id. at 109. The affidavit in Agui/ar stated: "'Affiants have received reliable informa-
tion from a credible person and do believe that [drugs] . . . are being kept at the above
described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of law.' " Id.
(quoting Affidavit).
28 Id. at 113; see also Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), where the Supreme
Court held that a magistrate may not issue a warrant based on a wholly conclusory state-
ment. The Court held inadequate an affidavit which had stated:
'Whereas said Francis B. Laughlin has stated under his oath that he has cause to suspect
and does believe that certain merchandise, to wit: Certain liquors of foreign origin a
more particular description of which cannot be given, upon which the duties have not
been paid, or which has otherwise been brought into the United States contrary to law,
and that said merchandise is now deposited and contained within the premises of J.J.
Nathanson. .. '
Id. at 44 (quoting Affidavit).
29 378 U.S. at 113.
3 0 Id. at 113-14.
31 393 U.S. at 415. In Spineli, FBI agents received information from an informant that
Spinelli was engaged in gambling activities. The agents submitted an affidavit for a search
warrant which, in addition to the tip, contained allegations that the agents had observed
Spinelli going to and from an apartment in St. Louis which the telephone company said
contained two telephones. The agents also stated that they were aware of Spinelli's general
reputation for gambling. Id. at 413-14. The Court applied theAguilar test and found that the
affidavit did not establish probable cause to issue a search warrant. Id. at 418.
32 Id. at 415.
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ration.33 If the affidavit fails to adequately set forth the informant's ba-
sis of knowledge, the tip nevertheless may be so detailed that the
magistrate may reasonably infer that the information was based on the
informant's personal knowledge.
34
In People v. Gates, the Illinois Supreme Court applied the two-
pronged test and found that Detective Mader's affidavit failed both the
basis-of-knowledge and veracity prongs. 35 The court found that the
anonymous tip failed the basis-of-knowledge prong because it did not
indicate that the information was based on the informant's personal
knowledge. 36 The court concluded that the tip also failed the veracity
prong because the informant's anonymity prevented the court from de-
termining the informant's credibility or the tip's reliability.3 7 The court
then stated that the corroborated information in the letter was insuffi-
ciently detailed for the magistrate to infer that the tip was based on the
informant's personal knowledge.
38
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the evidence corrob-
orated by the police, including the verification of the Gates' address and
travel plans, was of clearly innocent activity.39 The court held that cor-




34 Id. at 416-17.
35 85 Ill. 2d at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91.
36 Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890. The Illinois Supreme Court noted that although the
informant had stated that the Gates had boasted of their illegal activities, the court could not
determine whether they had made that statement directly to the informant. Similarly, while
the letter said that the Gates had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement, no state-
ment demonstrated that the informant had seen the drugs or was told about them. Thus, the
court concluded that the letter contained mere conclusions. Id. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 890.
37 Id. at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that, al-
though the identity of the informant need not be revealed, the credibility requirement was
usually satisfied by the police officer relating prior instances in which the officer had obtained
information from the informant that had resulted in arrests and convictions. In Gates, how-
ever, no one knew the informant's identity. Id. at 384-85, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
38 Id. at 386-89, 423 N.E.2d at 892-93. The court applied the concept of "self-verifying"
detail which the Supreme Court had developed in Spineli. See supra text accompanying note
34; infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
The court limited the use of self-verifying detail to satisfying the basis-of-knowledge
prong and found that naming the street where the Gates lived and stating that the Gates
would be driving from Florida in early May with drugs in their car did not meet the specific-
ity required to establish probable cause. Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
39 Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893. The court noted that "Mader's independent investiga-
tion revealed only that Lance and Susan Gates lived on Greenway Drive; that Lance Gates
booked passage on a flight to Florida; that upon arriving he entered a room registered to his
wife; and that he and his wife left the hotel together by car." Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
40 Id. at 390, 423 N.E.2d at 893 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 567 (1971))
(additional information acquired by police officers must in some sense be corroborative of the
informer's tip that the suspects committed or were in the process of committing a felony).
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
Writing for the majority in Gates, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the
totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an inform-
ant's tip can establish probable cause.41 He stated that the totality of the
circumstances test was far more consistent with the Court's prior treat-
ment of probable cause than the Aguilar-Spinelli test.42 While he ac-
knowledged that an informant's veracity, reliability, or basis of
knowledge may be relevant in determining whether probable cause ex-
ists, Justice Rehnquist concluded that these concerns are better under-
stood in the balancing approach of a totality of the circumstances test.
43
Justice Rehnquist expressed concern over the difficulty faced by
nonlawyer magistrates in applying the complex set of analytical and evi-
dentiary rules that had developed under the Agul/ar-Spinelli test.4 He
reasoned that a common sense totality of the circumstances approach
would help alleviate this problem.45 In addition, because of the fourth
amendment's strong preference for warrants and the Supreme Court's
traditional discouragement of de novo review of probable cause findings,
Justice Rehnquist determined that the fourth amendment required only
that a reviewing court find that the magistrate had a substantial basis
for concluding that a search would reveal evidence of a crime before
issuing a search warrant. 46 The magistrate's action cannot, however, be
"ca mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others. '4 7
Justice Rehnquist further indicated that rigid application of the
two-pronged test by the state courts had encouraged an "excessively
technical dissection of informants' tips"'4 8 and had resulted in significant
41 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
42 Id. at 2328. justice Rehnquist suggested that the two prongs were intended simply as
guidelines for magistrates and not as independent standards to be applied in every case. He
emphasized that, inAgui/ar, the Court required only that the affiant give some facts regarding
the basis of knowledge and veracity of the informant. Id. at 2328 n.6.
43 Id. at 2329. Thus, according to justice Rehnquist, "probable cause is a fluid concept-
turning on the assessment of probablities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 2328.
44 Id. at 2330-31.
45 Id. Justice Rehnquist stated that the totality of the circumstances test would better
enable magistrates to -draw reasonable inferences from the material supplied in the affidavit
because they would not be restricted by set rules. Furthermore, magistrates could still de-
mand any necessary assurances to demonstrate the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.
Id. at 2333.
46 Id. at 2331.
47 Id. at 2332.
48 Id. at 2330. Several lower courts which have applied the Aguilar-Spine//i rule have fur-
ther subdivided the veracity prong into reliability and credibility spurs. These courts have
required that the basis-of-knowledge prong and both spurs of the veracity prong be indepen-
dently satisfied before probable cause can exist to support the issuance of a warrant. See, e.g.,
People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d at 383-84, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91; Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App.
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injustices. 49 He also suggested that hypertechnical inspection of war-
rants by the courts with the two-pronged test encouraged police to en-
gage in warrantless searches with the hope of later relying on one of the
exceptions to the Warrant Clause to justify their search.
50
Justice Rehnquist also reasoned that the Aguilar-Spinelli test inter-
fered with law enforcement because anonymous tips would rarely sur-
vive its scrutiny.51 Noting the important role that such tips have played
in solving crime, he concluded that "[w]hile a conscientious assessment
of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amend-
ment, a standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen
informants is not.
' 52
Justice Rehnquist admitted that, unsupported, the anonymous let-
ter in Gates was inadequate to establish probable cause even under the
totality of the circumstances test.5 3 Therefore, he examined the police
corroboration to determine whether the corroboration of the letter was
sufficient to establish the necessary probable cause. Justice Rehnquist
noted that the corroborated details such as the flight to Florida, the brief
overnight stay, and the immediate return to Chicago were indicative of
507, 525, 313 A.2d 847, 858, cert. denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974); cf. United States v. Smith, 598
F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. McNally, 473 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1973) (both courts
using a totality of the circumstances approach to find probable cause).
For further discussions of application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, see LaFave, Probable Cause
From Informants: The Efects of lurphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. I11. L.F. 1;
Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REv. 741
(1974); Note, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling The Spinelli/Draper
Dichotomy In Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 99 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Anonymous flps]; Note, The Informer's Tz as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 958 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Informer's Tip].
49 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9. Justice Rehnquist cited three cases where reviewing state courts
had invalidated search warrants used to obtain crucial evidence because the underlying affi-
davit, although apparently adequate to establish probable cause, failed some technical aspect
of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. See People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (en
bane) (affidavit which stated that drugs were located on certain premises and where affiant
had previously supplied the police with drugs was held defective under both prongs of Aguilar-
Spinelli); People v. Palanza, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978) (cocaine excluded
because the affidavit did not indicate how the informant could tell the difference between
cocaine and other substances); cf. Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Grim. App. 1974)
(affidavit failed basis-of-knowledge prong even though the location of the gun was given by
an accomplice although admission into evidence held to be harmless error).
50 103 S. Ct. at 2331. Justice Brennan responded to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion by
noting that, subject to a few exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures areper se unreason-
able. Furthermore, the proponent of the exceptions would have a heavy burden of proof. Id.
at 2358-59 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 2331-32. Justice Rehnquist noted that anonymous informants usually do not
provide an elaborate recitation of the basis for their observations. Furthermore, the veracity
of persons supplying anonymous tips is largely unknown and unknowable. Id. See infra note
90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unreliability of anonymous tips.
52 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
53 Id. at 2326.
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a drug run suggesting that the Gates were trafficking in drugs. 54 Citing
Draper v. United States55 as the "classic" case on the value of police cor-
roboration, Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[t]he showing of prob-
able cause in the present case was fully as compelling as that in
Draper."56
Moreover, while Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the details
verified in Gates amounted only to "'the corroboration of innocent ac-
tivity,' -57 he rejected the Illinois Supreme Court's conclusion that inno-
cent activity could not establish probable cause.5 8 Because probable
cause does not require an actual showing of criminal activity, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that innocent behavior in light of suspicious cir-
cumstances may provide the basis for establishing probable cause.
5 9
Finally, Justice Rehnquist noted that the anonymous letter con-
tained details concerning future activities that the informant likely had
obtained from either the Gates themselves or someone familiar with
their plans.60 Justice Rehnquist also rejected Justice Stevens' concern in
dissent that an inaccuracy in the letter undermined its probative
value.6 1 Justice Rehnquist stated that "probable cause does not de-
54 Id. at 2334.
55 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In Draper, a known informant told federal agents that Draper
would arrive in Denver by train on either September eighth or ninth and that he would be
carrying three ounces of heroin. The informant also supplied a detailed description of Draper
and the clothes he would be wearing. The informant said that Draper would be carrying a
"tan zipper bag" and walking "real fast." Id. at 309. On September ninth, police observed a
man matching Draper's description alight from a train and walk rapidly towards the exit. His
clothing and luggage exactly matched the informant's description. Id. at 309-10. The Court
noted that the police had "personally verified every facet of the information given [them]...
except whether petitioner had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin
on his person or in his bag." Id. at 313. Thus, the Court held the arrest lawful and concluded
that, based on the details in the tip and the police corroboration, the agents had probable
cause to believe that Draper had committed a narcotics violation. Id. at 314.
56 103 S. Ct. at 2334. Justice Rehnquist noted that the police had corroborated the in-
formant's predictions that the Gates' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to
Florida in the next day or so, and that the Gates would immediately return to Bloomingdale.
He concluded that "[i]t is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corrobora-
tion through other sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating
tale,' thus providing a 'substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.'" Id. at 2335 (quoting
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960)).
57 Id. at 2335 n.13, quoting Joint Appendix at 12a, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983). See infia notes 81-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of corroboration of inno-
cent activity.
58 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.3.
59 Id. Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[i]n making a determination of probable cause
the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree
of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts." Id.
60 Id. at 2335.
61 Id. at 2335 n.14. Although the anonymous letter had said that Susan Gates would
drive to Florida and then fly back to Illinois, the affidavit reported that she drove back with
her husband. Id. at 2325-26.
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mand the certainty we associate with formal trials. It is enough that
there was a fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had
obtained his entire story either from the Gates or someone they
trusted. '62 Thus, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the judge issuing
the warrants had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed to search the Gates' home and car.
63
Justice White, in his concurrence, agreed that sufficient probable
cause existed to issue a search warrant but specifically rejected the total-
ity of the circumstances test. 64 Instead, he found that the warrant in
Gates could have been upheld within the Aguilar-Spnelli framework.
65
Justice White feared that the Court's totality of the circumstances test
would lead to an "evisceration" of the probable cause standard.
66
Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's rejection of the Aguilar-
Spinelli test. 67 Because of the inherent unreliability of anonymous in-
formant tips,68 he concluded that magistrates must apply the Aguilar-
Spineli" test to anonymous informant tips to ensure that the probable
cause justifying intrusions on an individual's privacy is based on infor-
mation from a credible person who acquired it in a reliable way.
69
Justice Brennan also disputed the majority's concern that the Agui-
lar-Soinelli standards serve only to confuse nonlawyer magistrates. On
the contrary, he stated that the standards could help to structure and
62 Id. at 2336.
63 Id. For cases involving the application of the totality of the circumstances test to other
aspects of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, see
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (particularized suspicion for investiga-
tory stops); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (voluntariness of consent
to search).
64 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 2347. Justice White agreed with the majority that the tip, by itself, did not
establish probable cause. He found, however, that the corroborated activity suggested a pat-
tern of drug-dealing. Moreover, Justice White stated that the critical issue was not the nature
of the suspects' activities but whether those actions gave rise to the inference that the inform-
ant was credible and obtained the information in a reliable manner. Id. at 2348.
Justice White reasoned that once the police had corroborated that Sue Gates would
drive to Florida, that Lance Gates would fly there in a few days and that they would drive the
car back, the magistrate could reasonably have inferred that the informant had not invented
the story but had obtained the information in a reliable way. Thus, Justice White concluded
that "the police investigation . . . had satisfactorily demonstrated that the informant's tip
was as trustworthy as one that would alone satisfy the Aguilar tests." Id. at 2349.
66 Id. at 2350.
67 Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent.
68 See infra note 90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unreliability of anony-
mous tips.
69 Id. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan determined that Aguilar and
Spinelli fulfilled an important fourth amendment role by informing both police and magis-
trates of the standard of information necessary to establish probable cause. Id. at 2356 n.6.
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guide magistrates' probable cause determinations. 70
Finally, Justice Brennan feared that, as Justice White had sug-
gested, the totality of the circumstances test would lead to an "eviscera-
tion" of the probable cause standard.71 He warned that the majority's
opinion demonstrated "an overly permissive attitude towards police
practices in derogation of the rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment."
72
VI. THE EFFECT OF GATES ON PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATIONS
According to Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court's reaffirmation
of the totality of the circumstances test was simply a return to the flex-
ible, common sense standard developed in pre-Aguilar cases. 73 For ex-
ample, in Draper v. United States,74 the Court used the totality of the
circumstances approach even though the informant had provided no
basis of knowledge for his tip. The Court determined that the police
verification of the details provided in the tip was sufficient to establish
probable cause. 75 Both Justices White and Brennan, however, suggested
70 Id. at 2358. Justice Brennan said that the Aguilar-Spine/li rules "structure the magis-
trate's probable cause inquiry and, more importantly, they guard against findings of probable
cause, and attendant intrusions, based on anything other than information which magistrates
reasonably can conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by an honest or credible per-
son." Id. at 2357 n.6.
71 Id. at 2359.
72 Id. Justice Stevens also dissented. He pointed out that although Justice Rehnquist had
stated that the Gates' behavior was indicative of a drug run, seesupra text accompanying note
54, the affidavit did not report that the Gates had done any of the things that drug couriers
are noted for doing. Id. at 2360 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens was also concerned with an error in the letter. See supra note 61. He
found the error significant for three reasons. First, it cast doubt on the informant's statement
that the Gates had over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement because, contrary to the
informant's prediction, the Gates did not arrange their travels to leave one person at home to
guard the drugs. Second, the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct seem less unusual since
instead of driving to Florida, leaving the car and immediately returning to Bloomingdale,
Susan Gates stayed and drove back with her husband. Third, the fact that the letter con-
tained a material mistake undermined the reasonableness of relying on it to make a search of
a private home. Id. at 2360.
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that no probable cause existed under any test to justify
the search of the Gates' home. Id. at 2361. However, he would have vacated and remanded
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court to decide if the search of the Gates' car was valid under
the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Gates, 103
S. Ct. at 2361-62. In Ross, the Court held that a police officer does not need a warrant to
search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.
456 U.S. at 809. The Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between home and auto-
mobile searches for the purposes of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
73 Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
74 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959).
75 Id. at 313-14.
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in Gates that the Court's return to the totality of the circumstances test
will result in the "evisceration" of the probable cause standard. 76 Al-
though the results of Gates may not be as drastic as Justices White and
Brennan predicted, the Gates decision does present problems because the
Court failed to articulate clear guidelines for determining probable
cause.
The Aguilar-Spinelli standards, although rigid, assisted magistrates'
determinations of probable cause by ensuring that they issued warrants
only on the basis of reliable information. 7 By adopting the totality of
the circumstances test in Gates, the Court requires magistrates to con-
sider all the information in the affidavit including the informer's relia-
bility, credibility, and basis of knowledge and to make a practical,
common sense decision whether to issue a warrant.78 Yet, the test gives
no practical guidance as to the relative weights assigned to any of these
considerations. The Court stated that the strength of one consideration
may compensate for a deficiency in another? 9 For example, judges and
magistrates may continue to use the strength of police corroboration to
overcome deficiencies in the informer's reliability or basis of knowledge.
In the past, however, the Court has been inconsistent in its treatment of
corroborative evidence;80 under the totality of the circumstances test,
therefore, the standard of corroboration will require further
clarification.
In Gates, the Court used Draper to support its contention that police
corroboration can establish probable cause.8 ' As in Gates,82 all of the
details corroborated in Draper were of innocent activity. 3 Yet, both
Draper and Gates appear to be irreconcilable with Spinelli, the Court's
only other major decision concerning the nature of corroborative evi-
dence sufficient to establish probable cause.8 4 In Spineli, the police also
had corroborated certain details of the informant's tip and, as in Draper
76 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
79 Id. at 2329.
80 See LaFave, supra note 48, at 58.
81 103 S. Ct at 2334.
82 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13.
83 Draper, 358 U.S. at 313.
84 Draper can be distinguished from Spinelli on the basis of the number of details verified.
In Draper, the police verified the suspect's description, his travel plans from Chicago to Den-
ver, and the train on which the suspect arrived. The Court said that the police had person-
ally verified every facet of the information except whether Draper was actually carrying the
heroin. 358 U.S. at 313. In Spinelli, by contrast the agents verified only that Spinelli had
made frequent trips to St. Louis where he had visited an apartment containing two tele-
phones. 393 U.S. at 413-14.
Justice White, however, recognized the conflict between the Aguilar-Spinelli and Draper
cases in his concurrence in Spinelli:
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and Gates, the corroborated activity was innocent.85 The Spinelli Court,
however, found that the corroborated details did not establish probable
cause.8 6 Further, the Court in Spinelli had explicitly rejected a totality
of the circumstances approach as being too broad.
8 7
In Gates, Justice Rehnquist failed to deal adequately with the irrec-
oncilability of Gates and Spinelli. He declined to decide whether, under
the totality of the circumstances test, the Court would now find the
Spiznelli affidavit adequate.8 8 This irreconcilability between Spinelli and
Gates may confuse judges and magistrates because it is unclear how
much corroboration of innocent activity will be sufficient to establish
probable cause.
Moreover, several commentators have strongly suggested that cor-
roboration of innocent activity alone is insufficient to establish probable
cause.8 9 Instead, to establish probable cause, corroborated details
should be of criminal activity. Requiring corroborative details to be of
criminal activity reduces the possibility that an informant is being un-
truthful in two situations. First, although both Draper and Spinelli in-
volved informants known to the police, the informant in Gates was
anonymous. Because the reliability and basis of knowledge of an un-
known informant are difficult to determine, corroboration becomes es-
pecially important under a totality of the circumstances approach.
Anonymous tips may be presumptively unreliable because the motives
of an anonymous informant are unknown and therefore inherently
The tension between Draper and the. . . Aguilar line of cases is evident from the
course followed by the majority opinion. First, it is held that the report from a reliable
informant that Spinelli is using two telephones with specified numbers to conduct a gam-
bling business plus Spinelli's reputation in police circles as a gambler does not add up to
probable cause. This is wholly consistent with Aguilar . . . : the informant did not re-
veal whether he had personally observed the facts or heard them from another and, if the
latter, no basis for crediting the hearsay was presented. . . . The Draper approach would
reasonably justify the issuance of a warrant in this case, particularly since the police had
some awareness of Spinelli's past activities.
393 U.S. at 427-28 (White, J., concurring).
85 See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 418. The Court found that the details "contain[ed] no sugges-
tion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves. . . and they [were] . . . not endowed
with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informer's tip." Id.
86 Id. at 418-19.
87 Id. at 415.
88 103 S. Ct. at 2332 n. 11. Justice Rehnquist noted:
Whether the allegations submitted to the magistrate in Spinelli would, under the
view we now take, have supported a finding of probable cause, we think it would not be
profitable to decide. There are so many variables in the probable cause equation that
one determination will seldom be a-useful "precedent" for another. Suffice it to say that
while we in no way abandon Spinelli's concern for the trustworthiness of informers and
for the principle that it is the magistrate who must ultimately make a finding of probable
cause, we reject the rigid categorization suggested by some of its language. Id.
89 See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 48, at 47; Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth
Amendment- A Searchfor MeaningfidStandards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 716 (1972); Note, The Informer's
Ti, supra note 48, at 965-66.
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suspect.90
Second, the Spinelli Court developed the concept of self-verifying
detail to correct the deficiencies in an informant's tip. Thus, a tip may
be so detailed that a magistrate could reasonably infer that the inform-
ant had obtained the information in a reliable way.9 1 Even though the
self-verifying details create a strong inference of personal knowledge, the
informant could still have fabricated the details. 92 Thus, a vindictive
informant could develop any number of innocent details that police
could easily corroborate 93 which would, under the Gates rationale, estab-
lish probable cause.
In both situations the Court could prevent this potential erosion of
fourth amendment protection against unwarranted intrusions by requir-
ing that the corroborative details sufficient to establish probable cause
be of criminal activity, thereby reducing the likelihood that the inform-
ant was lying about the alleged criminal activity.
94
A totality of the circumstances approach also will prevent the de-
90 See Rebell, supra note 89, at 714; LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L.REv. 39, 77-78 (1968); Note, Anonymous Tps, supra note
48, at 107, 122.
91 Spineli, 393 U.S. at 417. Courts, however, have limited this test to correcting deficien-
cies in the informant's basis of knowledge. See, e.g., People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d at 388, 423
N.E.2d at 892; see also Note, Probable Cause and the First Time Informer United States v. Harris,
43 CoLO. L. REV. 357, 362 (1972).
92 Comment, Adequay of Informant's Tib as Basis for Probable Cause Is Questioned: United
States v. Mitchell, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 908, 916-17 (1970).
93 See LaFave, supra note 48, at 55; Note, The Informer's Top, supra note 48, at 967. An
anonymous informant may be motivated by a sense of revenge. As Justice Harlan noted in
his dissent in United States v. Harris: "We cannot assume that the ordinary law-abiding
citizen has qualms about. . . cooperation with law enforcement officers." 403 U.S. 573, 599
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
94 See LaFave, supra note 48, at 55. Professor LaFave has suggested:
For corroboration to be incriminating rather than innocent, it is not necessary that
the events observed by the police supply probable cause by themselves or that they point
unequivocally in the direction of guilt. It is sufficient that they are "unusual and inviting
explanation," though "as consistent with innocent as with criminal activity."
I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3(f) (1978) (quoting People v. Alaimo, 34 N.Y. 2d
187, 189, 313 N.E.2d 55, 56, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 591, 592 (1974)).
Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit has said that the corroborated details must not in-
volve information that is generally available to the public but instead must show that the
informant possessed a "personal pipeline to the suspect's scheme." United States v. Tuley,
546 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).
Finally, one commentator has suggested that to establish probable cause based on an
undisclosed informant's tip, the Court should require a showing that the police investigation
uncovered "probative indications of [the] criminal activity" suggested by the informant as
opposed to "innocent behavioral patterns" like those in Draper. Rebell, supra note 89, at 716
n.7 0. To illustrate his theory, Rebell presents a hypothetical situation where an informant
has told police that every Tuesday at 8:00 p.m. a suspect, A, drives up to a specified address in
a blue convertible with a certain license plate number, and that A carries a brown attache
case which contains heroin that he sells. Under Rebell's theory, the police could establish
probable cause for a warrant only if, in addition to verifying the facts, they, for example,
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velopment of uniform standards because courts must resolve problems
on a case-by-case basis. 95 Although the Court was concerned that some
courts were applying the Aguilar-Spineii test in an overly technical man-
ner,96 perhaps, as Justice White suggested, the Court simply should have
clarified the Aguilar-Spinelli rule instead of substituting common sense
for guidelines.
9 7
In addition, the anonymous letter in Gates contained an inaccuracy
which the Court dismissed as unimportant,98 but the Gates Court did
not specify when the inaccuracies in a tip become sufficiently serious
that the magistrate should begin to question the reliability of the tip.
Thus, one inaccuracy is insufficient to cast doubt on an informant's tip.
Finally, the effect of the totality of the circumstances test will de-
pend on how the courts and magistrates who make the determinations
of probable cause use the test. Bereft of the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines,
courts and magistrates may rely more heavily on police expertise and
routinely approve any affidavit based on an informant's corroborated
tip. The magistrates and courts could then become a "rubber stamp" for
the police, eviscerating the standard of probable cause and severely in-
fringing upon citizens' fourth amendment rights.9 9
Of course, as Justice Rehnquist noted, the Supreme Court has held
that the magistrate's action cannot be a mere affirmation of the conclu-
sions or beliefs of others. °° Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist also
pointed out that under the totality of the circumstances test, magistrates
are free to continue to follow the Aguilar-Spine/li standards. I0 ' Thus,
observed known narcotics users entering and leaving the premises soon after A's arrival. Id. at
717-18.
95 Comment, supra note 92, at 917. Professor Weinreb has characterized the result in a
totality of the circumstances case as a long recitation of facts followed by a conclusion with no
logical connection between the two. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI.
L. REv. 47, 57 (1974). Another commentator has referred to the totality of the circumstances
test as the " 'I know it when I see it school ofjurisprudence.' " Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment
in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 793.
96 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. The Court's fears may have been unfounded because the
lower courts may already have been using a balancing test in applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test
to determine whether probable cause supported issuance of a warrant. See LaFave, supra note
48, at 60-67; Note, Anonymous Tips, supra note 48, at 108-13.
97 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 2335 n.14; see supra note 61.
99 Professor Amsterdam has suggested that
[i]f there are no fairly clear rules telling the policeman what he may and may not do,
courts are seldom going to say that what he did was unreasonable. The ultimate conclu-
sion is that "the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police."
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 394 (1974) (quoting
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)) (footnote omitted).
100 See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
101 See id. at 2333.
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those courts which have routinely applied the Aguilar-Spinelli rule may
continue to do so. Moreover, many states, like Illinois, have adopted
their own exclusionary rules.10 2 These states may continue to apply the
Aguilar-Spinei guidelines under their rules even though the Supreme
Court has modified the federal exclusionary rule.'0 3
VII. CONCLUSION
In Cates the Supreme Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-
Spinelli test in favor of a totality of the circumstances approach for de-
termining when an informant's tip is sufficient to establish probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant. The effect of the test on the stan-
dard of probable cause is uncertain. By removing the Aguilar-Spinel/i
standards without providing any practical guidelines, the Court has
made the test difficult to apply. Moreover, under the totality of the
circumstances approach, courts will have to resolve future problems on a
case-by-case basis. To reduce the likelihood that warrants will be issued
on the basis of untrue informants' tips, the Court should insist that any
corroborating details used to establish probable cause be of criminal
activity.
CATHY E. MOORE
102 Id. at 2323.
103 Id.
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